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INTRODUCTION
ITSim is a general purpose simulation system for decision-
support. It focuses on the simulation of coherent processes 
and provides additional methods for examining 
optimization tasks within the broader range of tasks of the 
German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr. Modern warfare 
scenarios are dominated by asymmetric threats with 
complex non-linear interdependencies and interrelations 
that traditional techniques of analysis are insufficient to 
capture. For example, it is often hard to determine whether 
located humans are opponents (red) or just civilians 
(neutral). We use a base protection scenario and evaluate 
several active defense options against small teams firing 
improvised ballistic rockets at the camp. Based on the 
scenario introduced at the International Data Farming 
Workshop 18 (IDFW18) [1], the Force-Protection domain is 
enhanced to investigate further issues.
The investigated scenario analyzes exactly that aspect by 
using 3D terrain augmented with semantic information 
provided by the German Armed Forces. The data is not 
modeled but imported from an official data source. During 
this workshop, we wanted to answer two questions: 
1. Does the consideration of semantic information (see 
below) result in a statistically significant change of 
the investigated Measure of Effectiveness (MoE)? 
Note that the consideration of semantic information 
will result in a more realistic environment model. 
But this more precise model raises costs in 
computation and modelling time. If the MoE is not 
affected by this additional effort, we can omit 
semantic information for this scenario.
2. Does an optimization of blue emplacements in 
order to increase the observed area (see below) 
result in a statistically significant improvement of 
blue’s success w.r.t. the investigated MoE?
Of course, we expect the answer to this question to be 
true. It is interesting to investigate the importance of the 
optimization criterion w.r.t. the investigated MoE. If the 
criterion is not important, the MoE will not be affected. In 
future, we are interested in performing several optimizations 
according to several criteria in order to determine the most 
important ones.
Figure 1: Base in 3D terrain with semantic information
SCENARIO
Figure 1 depicts the investigated scenario. A blue base is 
located in 3D terrain with additional semantic information. 
Dark regions mark high terrain elevation whereas bright 
areas denote lower terrain. Thus, the blue base is located on 
a hill. The semantic information is attached directly to the 
terrain data. Basically, it is a classification of the terrain, 
including rivers, buildings, different types of wood, different 
types of streets and flat terrain. In figure 1, woods are 
visualized as green areas and plain terrain is depicted in 
yellow. Additionally, the dark roadmap and the blue river 
can be recognized. In the lower right part of figure 1, many 
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buildings colored in red are visible. Two towers equipped 
with cameras are used to observe the surrounding area of 
the camp. They are visualized by tactical icons in the upper 
part of figure 1. During the course of the scenario, some Red 
will approach the base in order to attack it with ballistic 
weapons. 
The key idea is that the opponents cannot be detected as 
Red until they start to prepare their attack. Thus, the whole 
approach time cannot be used to prevent the attack. After the 
configured preparation time, the opponents launch n missiles 
(with reload time in between) and flee afterwards.
The scenario’s analysis is divided into two phases. The 
first one is a static classification and the second one is a 
simulation capturing the dynamics of the strategies.
Static Classification
Before the scenario is simulated dynamically, a static 
classification is performed. Two important measures are vital 
for the strategies: Ballistic threat and line-of-sight. Areas 
from which the base can be attacked by ballistic weapons are 
called ballistically threatening. The muzzle velocity of the 
weapon defines its maximal distance. The terrain defines if 
there is an angle that results in a flight trajectory such that 
the base can potentially be hit. Considering the semantic 
information, we defined that it is impossible to attack 
ballistically from rivers, buildings and woods. Thus, the 
ballistic threat strongly depends on the given terrain and 
semantic augmentation. The line-of-sight denotes which 
areas can be observed by the cameras in the base. These cells 
are called observable.
In order to perform the classification, the area around the 
base is gridded. Afterwards, every cell, i.e. grid element, is 
checked if it is ballistically threatening and observable. Note 
that the terrain itself is not gridded but based on precise 
vector data. According to that classification, three cases exist:  
• Green: A cell  is not ballistically threatening, i.e. the 
base cannot be attacked from that cell. The Blue don’t 
have to worry about that cell. Therefore, the cell  is 
colored green.
• Yellow: A cell is ballistically threatening and 
observable. Thus, the base can be attacked from that 
cell and there is a  line-of-sight to the Blue. The 
attackers can be detected while they prepare their 
attack. The cell is colored yellow.
• Red: A cell is ballistically threatening and not 
observable. Thus, the base can be attacked from that 
cell and there is no line-of-sight to the base. The 
attackers cannot be identified while they prepare their 
attack. This is the worst case for the blue forces and 
the cell is colored red.
If the semantic information is taken into account in the 
grid classification, the ballistic reachability is restricted by not 
allowing shots from woods, rivers and buildings. This 
reduces the opponent’s area of operation. This might have an 
effect on the optimization, because a smaller  area needs to be 
monitored. Thus, fewer emplacements might be needed in 
order to establish a certain success for Blue.  The result of this 
classification is depicted in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows 
the classification with considering the semantic information, 
figure 3 without. Considering the semantics changes the 
number of green, i.e. not ballistically threatening, cells from 
21.8% to 48.2%. Thus, roughly 26.4 percent of the cells are not 
longer threatening for Blue. This consideration of ballistic 
semantics results in a limitation for Red’s area of operation. 
By comparing figures 1, 2 and 3, we can recognize that the 
woods (depicted green in figure 1) are ballistically 
threatening in figure 3 (classification without semantics) but 
are not in figure 2 (classification with semantics). The same 
holds for the river, which can be recognized in figure 2. Note 
that when considering a higher grid resolution, i.e. smaller 
grid cells, the whole calculation gets more accurate and the 
river can be recognized more clearly.
Figure 2: Result of classification considering semantics
Figure 3: Classification without considering semantics
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Simulation of the Strategies
In order to be able to compare the semantics impact on 
Blue’s success, several strategies have been evaluated against 
a given red behavior. This kind of analysis may give 
interesting hints to support the defending of the base. The 
red strategy is fixed in all experiments. It consists of the 
following steps: 
• Generation: The units are generated uniformly 
distributed outside the base. Their affiliation is 
neutral, i.e. they cannot be detected as hostile.
• Approach: A yellow or red cell (i.e. a ballistic attack is 
possible from that cell) is selected and moved to. The 
unit is still not detectable as hostile.
• Preparation: Two cases exist. If the attacker can detect 
any blue unit it gets discouraged and flees. Otherwise 
it starts to prepare its attack. From that point in time, it 
can be detected as hostile by Blue. As soon as the blue 
force is detected by the red unit, the Red aborts its 
preparation and flees. Note that the cameras’ sight 
range is much higher than the one for regular ground 
troops including red attackers and blue defenders. 
• Attack: The Red starts to fire a previously defined 
number of projectiles (intended shot number) at the 
base. From this point in time, the attacker is detected 
as hostile by the blue defenders if it has not already 
been. Between the shots, the attacker has to reload. 
Afterwards, it flees.
Currently, Blue has three different strategy options to 
prevent ballistic bombardment at the base:
1. Pursue  from Base (PfB): A blue Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) is located inside the base and pursues the red 
attackers as soon as they have been detected. The 
attacker can be observed by the cameras or they 
reveal themselves by shooting projectiles at the 
base.
2. Camouflaged Emplacements  (CE): Camouflaged 
spotters are located outside the base. They can 
detect the Red but not vice versa. As soon as the red 
units are located, their position is reported to the 
base and the QRF starts the counterattack at the 
Red.
3. Show of Forces (SoF): Patrols move around the base. 
They can detect the Red and can also be detected by 
these. If any red force is located, the nearest patrol 
starts a counter attack. Note that there is no QRF in 
the base as in the other strategies. A red opponent 
detecting an approaching patrol is going to flee.
The semantic attributes influence the routing of the units. 
According to the different road types, a restriction to the top-
speed along the roads is modeled. Thus, Blue’s as well as 
Red’s speed will be reduced on certain routes. One might 
expect less success for Blue, but this is not clear since both 
parties drive slower. 
As a MoE we used the percentage of PreventedShots, 
defined as the ratio of prevented shots with respect to the 
number of intended shots. For example, if the red attacker 
intended to shoot two times and has been neutralized after 
one shot, PreventedShots is 0.5. Additionally, we measured 
the following MoEs, which are not further regarded in this 
report due to space limitations:
• PreventedShots: The number of prevented shots at the 
base. This happens if the attacker is neutralized or 
discouraged before the attack is started. 
• PreventedAllShots: This binary MoE is true, when all 
intended shots have been prevented.
• NeutralizedAttacker: The number of neutralized 
attackers. 
Figure 4: Classification with 3 active emplacements considering 
ballistic semantics
Figure 5: Classification with 3 active emplacements without 
considering semantics
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In order to distribute the emplacements in the CE 
vignette, an optimization feature is used. The user has to 
define several possible positions and ITSim distributes up to n 
spotters over these possible positions. Figures 4 and 5 depict 
the possible emplacement position, the green icons. The 
visibility of the 3 active emplacements (the larger icons) is 
currently considered in the classification. 
Figure 4 shows the optimal distribution of 3 
emplacements considering the ballistic semantics and figure 5 
shows the same distribution on a  grid without considering 
ballistic semantics. The green cells remain unchanged as can 
be seen by a comparison of figure 4 and 5 with 2 and 3, 
respectively. Considering the semantics, the number of green 
cells is 18,144 of 37,638, i.e. 48.21 percent. When omitting the 
semantics, we only have 8,209 corresponding to a percentage 
of 21.81. The optimization maximizes the number of yellow 
cells with constant green ones. Thus, the optimization 
criterion is the number of yellow cells divided by the sum of 
red and yellow cells. 
Figure 6: Percentage of yellow cells
Figure 6 shows this measure for the best and worst 
distribution of 0 up to 19 emplacements with and without 
considering semantics. The typical logarithmic shaped curve 
indicates that saturation is reached. The best distributions are 
much better than the worst ones if the number of possible 
decisions is sufficiently high. Note that the 0- and 19-
distribution are exactly the same in the worst and best 
optimization since no decision can be made. Running the 
optimization on the grid considering ballistic semantics gives 
better results if at least six emplacements are distributed than 
the optimization results on the non-semantic one. The 
advantage of considering the semantics is because of the 
restricted operational area for Red. Note that the non-semantic 
grid is superior without any spotters being distributed. The 
reason for this is that most cells getting green are also visible 
by the watch towers. In eight of nineteen distributions, the 
result is different. 
In SoF, the QRF is not waiting in the base but patrolling in 
the valley as depicted in figure 7. The blue line is its current 
route. The red attacker in the upper part of figure 7 is 
currently approaching its improvised fire position. In this 
case, a QRF positioned in the base would probably perform 
better. Note that the camera towers inside the base always 
support the detection of the Red. As mentioned above, the red 
units can only be detected after they have started preparing 
their attack. The QRF has limited time to reach the attackers 
before they can fire their rockets.
Figure 7: Running simulation of SoF
Although we defined three different strategy options for 
the blue forces, we are not interested in comparing these. As 
already stated in the introduction, we want to evaluate the 
influence of the additional semantic information as well as 
the optimization feature. Basically, PfB is a sub-strategy of CE 
(with no emplacements) as well  as SoF with only one patrol 
staying in the base. In the following, we want to use all 
strategies to evaluate the semantics’ influence on the MoE. 
With the CE strategies, we want to determine the impact of 
the optimization feature.
Factor Min Max Unit
Speed QRF 20 75 km/h
Speed Red 20 75 km/h
Height Red 1.5 3.0 m
Setup Time Red 2 10 min
Reload Time Red 1 3 min
Mean Detection Time Camera 1 3 min
Mean Detection Time Emplacements 1 3 min
Intended Shots Red 1 3
Table 1: NOLH design
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We used a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) [2] 
design with 65 design points for our experiments and 
crossed it with the two kinds of semantics. Thus, all 
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experiments have been run on the grid depicted in figures 2 
and 3, with and without considering the semantics for the 
ballistic reachability, respectively. Additionally, we ran all 
scenarios by using the semantic routing or not. By using it, 
the routing algorithm is aware of the top-speed restriction on 
the roads. The NOLH design (see table 1) consists of the 
following parameters: Speed of blue QRF, mean time of 
detection of the cameras on the watch towers in the blue 
base, the mean time of detection of the blue emplacements, 
the speed of the red attackers, the height of Red, Red’s setup 
time (the time needed to build up its ballistic weapon), the 
reload time of Red and the number of intended shots at the 
base. For each design point 50 replications are conducted 
with different seeds. In total 13,000 simulation runs for each 
scenario are performed. Altogether, we modeled 8 scenarios, 
i.e. one PfB, one SoF and six CE scenarios. The latter 
scenarios were calculated with 1, 3 and 5 spotters, 
distributed according to best and worst optimization results, 
respectively. Thus, we performed 104,000 simulation runs.
As mentioned above, we wanted to examine the impact 
of considering the semantics as well as performing the 
optimization on blue’s success, i.e. the MoE PreventedShots. 
Additionally, we compare Blue’s strategies very briefly.
Impact of Optimization
The optimization result depends on the ballistic specific 
interpretation of the semantics. If the information is 
considered, different distributions are calculated as already 
mentioned above and can be seen in figure 6. For simplicity, 
we only used the results of the grid considering the 
semantics and evaluated this distribution with both grids, 
i.e. the semantic and non-semantic one. We distributed one, 
three and five emplacements according to the best and worst 
optimization result. Tables 2 and 3  show the results. Note 
that 0  observers correspond to the PfB strategy serving as 
baseline. The worst distribution of observers made the MoE 
PreventedShots even worse. 
# observer Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
0
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
1
mean 0.359 Mean 0.264
std-dev 0.442 std-dev 0.405
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
3
mean 0.470 mean 0.360
std-dev 0.468 std-dev 0.441
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.005
5
mean 0.561 mean 0.446
std-dev 0.463 std-dev 0.462
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.006
Table 2: “Best” optimization of CE
In most cases, the best distribution outperformed the 
worst one significantly. Only the non-ballistic grid with one 
emplacement is an outlier. The reason therefore is that the 
optimization has been performed considering ballistic 
semantics but the simulation has not. Thus, the optimization 
criterion does not match the simulated reality. This artifact is 
a hint that the model of the optimization is not accurate 
enough and is a great indication that accurate and correct 
models must be used during optimization and simulation in 
order to get robust results. Thus, we claim that our 
optimization according to the visibility of the spotters 
improves Blue’s statistically significant.
# observer Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
0
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
1
mean 0.316 mean 0.288
std-dev 0.428 std-dev 0.416
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
3
mean 0.235 mean 0.219
std-dev 0.389 std-dev 0.375
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
5
mean 0.203 mean 0.241
std-dev 0.374 std-dev 0.390
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
Table 3: “Worst” optimization of CE
Impact of Semantics
“Does considering the semantics have an impact on Blue’s 
success?” - “It depends.”
The impact of the semantic information is different 
according to the different effects. We modeled two effects: The 
impact on the ballistic reachability as well as the impact on the 
semantic routing referred to as ballistic semantics and road 
semantics, respectively. 
Strategy Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
PfB
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
SoF
mean 0.532 mean 0.536
std-dev 0.463 std-dev 0.471
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.006
Table 4: PreventedShots of PfB and SoF
The impact of the ballistic semantics can be read off 
tables 2, 3  and 4 for the different strategies. Especially with 
CE, a significant effect can be seen, since in all cases, Blue’s 
success raises when ballistic semantics has been considered 
during simulation. The main reason therefore is that the 
semantics has been considered during the optimization step. 
For the baseline PfB, the impact is also significant. The reason 
therefore is that many cells that are green, i.e. not ballistically 
threatening, only if the semantic is considered are located far 
away from the base (cf. figures 2 and 3). These cells cannot be 
reached by the QRF in time with high probability. Thus, Red 
can launch more attacks if the ballistic semantics is not 
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considered. Using strategy SoF Blue performs not significantly 
different in comparison to the scenario without semantics. 
The reason is that the patrol route (cf. figure 7) is located in an 
area where many cells are ballistically threatening only if the 
semantics are not considered. Thus, Red attackers appear 
near the patrol route very likely and are neutralized with 
high probability. Thereby note that the patrol route has not 
been optimized but chosen quite arbitrarily by the user. 
Summarizing the ballistic semantics’ effects, we claim that the 
impact is strongly related to the blue strategies and the 
amount of knowledge that has been used for their 
optimization. It is important that this optimization must 
consider the same semantic information as the simulation 
does. The reason for PfB to perform better without semantics 
and SoF to perform the same is random: The SoF patrol route 
has been chosen luckily and the far cells that are very unlikely 
to be reached in time from the base are not ballistically 
threatening when considering the semantics. But it is very 
important to have an accurate model in order to influence the 
strategy by optimization and simulation.
The answer to the second question is different. In all 
scenarios, the road semantics had no significant effect. For 
brevity, we do not show any results. We think the main reason 
was a realistic top-speed restriction on the road. Additionally, 
this restriction holds for red as well as for blue forces. Since 
both units had quite similar speeds (cf. table 1), they were 
restricted similarly on the roads and no influence of the 
success could be determined statistically. The road semantics 
might get interesting if it is considered for the setup of the 
strategy, e.g. during an optimization of patrol routes.
Comparison of Blue Strategies
During IDFW18, we also compared the different strategy 
options itself. Although this comparison was not our aim at 
this workshop, we can compare the strategies with tables 2, 3 
and 4. Note that PfB is a sub-strategy of SoF as well as CE. 
Thus, we only have to compare the latter two strategies. CE 
is supported by the optimization module and the patrol 
route of the modeled SoF scenario has been chosen 
arbitrarily. The baseline strategy PfB is the worst one for  Blue 
if we exclude the CE strategies with worst distributions. If 
we then distribute emplacements in an intelligent, i.e. 
optimized, manner, Blue’s success rises as can be seen by the 
CE scenarios. Following strategy SoF with one patrol is 
nearly as successful (with the defined patrol route) as 
distributing 5 emplacements. This result basically confirms 
our results from IDFW18. The reasons for SoF’s success are 
the following: On the one hand, the patrol in our scenario is 
in an area where attackers approach with high probability. 
Thus the time needed to disturb the Red is quite short. On 
the other hand, there exists a chance that Red senses Blue 
before starting to prepare its attack. Then it gets discouraged 
and flees without any attack. For these two reasons, SoF 
seems to be the best strategy for Blue. This superiority might 
even rise when the patrol routes are also optimized or more 
patrols are distributed. 
Limitations
There are some limitations in our experiments. Concerning 
the optimization part, we can do a crossing of optimization 
and simulation runs. Although we optimized certain number 
of emplacements with and without considering the ballistic 
semantics, we only simulated the results of the former 
optimization. During the simulation, we then considered 
both ballistic grids again. In upcoming studies, we want to 
simulate the results of the latter optimization with both grids 
in order to check if a significant impact on Blue’s success can 
be measured. 
Another important limitation is that we are able to 
optimize the visibility of spotters, only. Additionally, we could 
define several optimization criterions, e.g. the reachability of 
possible attack points, in order to distribute QRFs outside the 
base also. One major challenge is the definition of the 
optimality if several criteria are considered. This is also subject 
to further research.
For an extensive comparison of the strategies, the 
following questions should be answered:
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
cover all cells? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be distributed such 
that most cells are covered? 
• What is a good ratio between covered cells and used 
emplacements/ patrols?
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
avoid any attack? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be placed such that 
most attacks are avoided?
• What is a  good ratio between avoided attacks and 
used emplacements/ patrols?
The first three questions can be answered for 
emplacements, but not for patrols since we currently are not 
able to optimize dynamic patrol routes. The last three 
questions could be answered by using simulation runs, but 
we have no hint for patrols to be defined without a 
corresponding optimization. Especially the third and sixth 
question is relevant since a notion of used resources and 
utility comes into account. The third question is basically 
answered for emplacements in figure 6.
The last limitation mentioned here is that only one 
specific Red behavior is modeled, which is also not evolving 
over time. We also always consider exactly a single attack and 
not multiple coordinated attacks which adapt to Blue’s 
strategy. In order to challenge these questions at least semi-
automated, we want to further extend our current approach 
with optimization techniques which are able to derive 
strategy settings automatically. Such a system could use 
evolutionary algorithms combined with data farming similar 
to Automated Red Teaming (ART) [3] and Automated Co-
Evolution (ACE) [3].
CONCLUSIONS
During this study, we evaluated the influence of considering 
semantic attachments to our terrain data on Blue’s success in 
terms of the regarded MoE PreventedShots. We wanted to 
check if it is worth to invest the effort to model or import 
such semantic attachments and model the reaction to it. We 
explicitly do not want to generate results like: “Blue’s MoE 
decreases when considering semantics, so we do not 
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consider it!” We claim that such a model is more realistic and 
thus more accurate. The question is if we want to invest the 
effort to improve such a model. As can be seen in the results 
of the optimization of emplacement positions, any 
information that is used to optimize some task must be 
based on an accurate model in order to generate correct 
results. For example, a spotter  distribution generated on a 
ballistic grid considering semantics performs very well in a 
simulation considering ballistic semantics but not necessarily 
in a simulation without considering ballistic semantics. 
We want to emphasize that the terrain data as well as the 
semantic attributes have not been modeled by us but are 
imported from a database of the German Armed Forces. We 
simply modeled the reaction to the attribute values, e.g. the 
top-speed restrictions of certain unit types on certain road 
types. Basically, we modeled effect of the semantics to the 
routing (road semantics) and to the ballistic threatening of 
cells (ballistic semantics). 
The influence of the ballistic semantics is statistically 
significant if the information is used to set up the strategy. It is 
not significant and even arbitrary if we just evaluate a given 
scenario or strategy. The impact of road semantics is not 
significant in our study. This last result was a surprise.
Additionally, we wanted to check if our optimization 
according to the grid-visibility results in a significant 
improvement of Blue’s success. During the investigation we 
learned that the latter question can be answered with a “yes”, 
i.e. there is a significant improvement, if the model of the 
optimization is close enough to the model of the simulation. 
As future work, we want to extend our approach as 
mentioned above. Additionally, we want to analyze the 
impact of the optimization, extend the system to be able to 
cope with several optimization criteria, develop an 
optimization for dynamic patrol routes and try to cope with 
coordinating and evolving red behavior.
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